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Abstract: We theoretically examine a farmer’s coverage demand with area and individual 
insurance plans as either separate or integrated options. The individual and area losses are 
assumed to be imperfectly and positively correlated. With actuarially fair rates, the farmer will 
fully insure with the individual plan and demand no area insurance regardless of the plans being 
separate or integrated. Under separate plans, free area insurance and the fair rate for individual 
insurance, area insurance replaces a portion of individual insurance demand. Under integrated 
plans, free area insurance, and the fair rate for individual insurance, the farmer over-insures 
using both area and individual plans. 
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The Federal Crop Insurance (CI) program has grown to become the centerpiece of the 
agricultural safety net for crops and currently protects nearly $80 billion worth of liability. 
Government spending on crop insurance is now projected to exceed spending on farm 
commodity programs in future years (Shields, Monke and Schnepf, 2010). With all farm support 
programs expected to face tight budget constraints in the upcoming Farm Bill, alternative 
programs are under examination to reduce spending, simplify programs, and eliminate 
redundancy. Therefore, it is imperative to examine the interaction of crop insurance and other 
farm support programs and assess how producers may be affected by emerging Farm Bill 
proposals for alternative farm support structures.   
  A key development in the last Farm Bill was the move toward revenue protection as an 
objective of traditional farm programs. Early proposals for the next Farm Bill have included 
variations on the role of revenue protection in farm programs, with an emphasis on improved 
area revenue protection. However, most crop insurance policies sold today provide revenue 
protection on either a county or individual basis. This situation is raising fundamental questions 
about the effectiveness for producers of area versus individual revenue protection plans, with 
such plans used either separately or in combination with one another. Consequently, the focus of 
this article is on the connection between individual and area plans of crop insurance and current 
and proposed area revenue plans under farm programs. We address this issue by deriving the 
producer’s preference for coverage among the various area and individual plans of revenue 
protection by using an economic model of producer choice. We present conclusions from the 
model on a producer’s choice and discuss these in the context of the economic literature on area 
plans. 
One aspect of the ongoing Farm Bill discussion is the relative roles of crop insurance and 4 
 
area revenue programs. Since the 1990s, farmers have had both individual farm and county-
based Revenue Insurance Plans available within the CI program, which protect against revenue 
shortfalls. The CI revenue plans currently constitute nearly the 80% of total premium. The Food, 
Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008 (2008 Farm Bill) authorized additional farm programs to 
protect revenue. One plan, the Supplemental Revenue Assistance Payments Program (SURE), is 
a whole farm program that supplements CI and the Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance 
Program. Payments under SURE are based on individual producer losses over an entire farm.  
However, the other new plan, Average Crop Revenue Election (ACRE), protects against revenue 
shortfalls at the state level. Some concerns on possible overlap and duplication of coverages 
between ACRE and CI have been raised (Zulauf, Schnitkey and Langemier, 2010; Barnaby, 
2010). 
There are also proposals emerging for changing ACRE into a county-level area plan and 
integrating that with crop insurance (Babcock, 2010). Integrated programs are also known as 
“wrapped insurance,” where individual insurance works as if “wrapped” around the area 
program only paying when an individual’s indemnities exceed payments from the area program.  
Individual crop insurance would pay the residual amount once area payments are netted out 
(Coble and Barnett, 2008). Similarly, Cooper (2010) includes ACRE payments in the harvest-
time premium calculation for CI.   
A solid understanding of the interaction of CI with area insurance and related revenue 
programs and how these options address the risk management needs of producers and affect their 
participation decisions is essential for a healthy public policy discussion. However, the literature 
developing the factors behind a producer’s choice of area insurance, such as Miranda (1991) and 5 
 
Mahul (1999), has not taken into account the availability of multiple insurance or farm program 
alternatives in the analytical modeling.  
In order to extend past research on producer choice to better incorporate policy choices 
that might be considered for the upcoming Farm Bill discussions, we developed a stylized 
analytical model to assess a farmer’s choice of coverage levels from individual and alternative 
area plans of insurance. We combined the two-point distribution approach used in the Duncan 
and Myers (2000) insurance model with the correlation modeling approach used in Bulut and 
Moschini (2006). The model is flexible to accommodate existing insurance plans such as the 
yield-based Group Risk Plan (GRP) or the revenue-based Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP)  
and current or proposed farm revenue protection programs (such as the current ACRE or a 
county-based ACRE).  
We identify the main factors determining the farmer’s coverage demands as: the premium 
rates, expected farmer’s and area losses, standard deviations of farmer’s and area losses, the 
correlation between farmer’s and area losses, and the farmer’s degree of risk aversion. Overall, 
the findings indicate a strong case for individual insurance vis-à-vis area insurance when the 
premium rates for area and individual plans are actuarially fair (equal to expected indemnities).  
The theoretical model provided here may help evaluate the effectiveness of proposed 
county-level area plans from a pure risk management perspective. The model can be useful to 
explain the pattern of actual coverage in counties where ACRE participation is low or high. It 
also helps explain regional participation levels in county-level insurance plans, such as the yield-
based Group Risk Plan (GRP) or the revenue-based Group Risk Income Protection (GRIP). 
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces the model. The insurance 
decision of the farmer is analyzed in the following contexts as subsections: 1) solely with an individual plan of insurance; 2) solely with an area plan of insurance; 3) with either an individual 
or an area plan of insurance but not both simultaneously; 4) with separate area and individual 
plans of insurance that may be held either alone or simultaneously; 5) with integrated area and 
individual plans of insurance that may be held either alone or simultaneously. At each 
subsection, the results are provided. Following is a discussion of our findings in connection with 
the related literature. Finally, in the last section, we present the major conclusions.  
 
Modeling 
As in Duncan and Myers (2000), the farmer has a mean-variance utility function, pays a 
premium and chooses coverage levels. In addition, we introduce area insurance plans and define 
the joint distribution of individual and area losses where the losses are imperfectly and positively 
correlated. The correlation modeling approach used in Bulut and Moschini (2006) is adopted 
here. We then solve a risk-averse farmer’s optimization problem under various insurance plan 
options.  
Insurance Decision with Individual Plan of Insurance 
Duncan and Myers (2000) formulated a farmer’s insurance demand without considering area-
based insurance. Their framework is adopted here. The farmer faces the prospect of a loss 
(denoted with l) with probability  l p  and no loss with probability (1 ) l p − . Then, the expected 
loss (l ) and the variance of loss (
2
l σ ) can be obtained as  
  l lp = l
l
           ( 1 )    
22 (1 ) ll lp p σ =−           ( 2 )  
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  The farmer is assumed to have a linear mean-variance preference function
2 specified as 
2 0.5
i ix i UM x l l π λσ =− − −          ( 3 )  
where U denotes utility, M : the farmer’s initial income,  x π : premium per unit of insurance 
coverage level, x: coverage level,  i l : the farmer’s expected loss with coverage, λ : risk aversion 
parameter, 
2
i l σ : variance of the farmer’s expected loss with coverage.  
If a farmer holds x units of coverage with individual insurance, then the expected 
indemnity (denote with  i R
(
 ) would be  
  il R xp l xl ==
(
           ( 4 )  
The expected loss of farmer   with coverage would be  i




       ( 5 )  
And the variance of the loss of the farmer when the farmer has coverage units of x would be 
22 22 2 (1 ) (1 ) (1 )
i ll l l x xl p p σσ =− =− −         ( 6 )  
                                                 
2 The mean-variance model was also used in the literature studying area insurance such as 
Miranda (1991) and Barnett et al. (2005). These studies assume actuarially fair rates so that 
maximizing mean-variance utility reduces to minimizing the variance. Meyer (1987) shows that 
mean-variance utility maximization is equivalent to expected-utility maximization under a 
sufficient condition (the location and scale parameter condition), which tends to hold in many 
economic models. Whether the location and scale parameter condition holds for crop insurance 
losses (yield or revenue) in particular is an empirical question which can be investigated along 
the lines of Antle (2010).        
7 
 The farmer’s problem is to maximize the utility function in equation (3) by choosing a 
non-negative level of coverage x.
3 The necessary and sufficient first-order condition (F.O.C.) to 
solve this problem is  
 
2 (1 ) 0 l lx πλσ −++ − =         ( 7 )  
Solving this condition yields demand for insurance as  








=+ (           ( 8 )  
The demand for coverage decreases with the increases in premium  x π  and increases with 
increases in the expected loss l . If the insurance is actuarially fair, that is, premium rate equals 
expected loss,  x l π = so that the premium amount would equal expected indemnity in equation 
(4), then the strictly risk averse individual will insure completely ( 1 x = ( ).
4  If the premium rate is  
x l π > , that is, rates are unfair (overrated), the demand for coverage will be less than one and 
increasing with the risk aversion parameter λ  and the variance of loss 
2
l σ . Note that premiums 
for insurance other than Federal crop insurance typically involve an expense load, which may 
cause the premium rates to be higher than the expected indemnity. If insurance is underrated, that 
                                                 
3 Similar to Duncan and Myers, a deductable or co-insurance is not considered because the 
probability of loss is assumed to be unaffected by the individual’s actions. One possible 
extension here would be to consider possibility that the individual can affect the probability of 
loss through some effort. 
4 See also Example 6.C.1. on page 187 in Mas-Colell, Whinston, and Green (1995).   
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 is,  x l π < , then the demand for coverage will exceed one (over-insurance) and be decreasing 
with the risk aversion parameter λ  and the variance of loss 
2
l σ . 
Introducing the Area Plans of Insurance 
Suppose that area insurance is available and pays whenever there is a loss at the area 
level. Denote the amount of area loss with L  and probability of loss for the area with  L p . One 
can verify that the expected area loss (denoted with L ) and the variance of the area loss (denoted 
with 
2
L σ ) are  
L L pL =            ( 9 )    
 
22 (1 ) L LL L pp σ =−           ( 1 0 )  
Denote the coverage demanded for area insurance with  y and the associated premium per unit of 
coverage with  y π . If the farmer holds  units of coverage from area insurance, then the farmer’s 
expected loss solely from area loss  
y
  ( iL ) L yp L =−            ( 1 1 )  
which is the negative of the expected indemnity with area insurance. Moreover, the variance of 
farmer’s loss with area coverage would be 
 
22 2 2 2 (1 )
i L LL L yy Lp p σσ == − .          ( 1 2 )  
In the next section, we define the joint distribution between individual and area losses.   
9 
 The Joint Distribution of the Individual and Area Losses  
The joint distribution of the individual and the area losses is as follows. Denote the 
random outcome of whether a loss occurred for the farmer and the area with  i X  and  a X , 
respectively. Then, the events possible ( , ) ia X X  are: both individual and area see a production 
loss,  ; individual sees a loss but area does not, (1, ; individual does not see a loss but area 
does, (0 ; and neither individual nor area sees a loss,  . The probability matrix for these 





  Area with a loss (1)  Area without a loss ( )  0
Individual with a loss (1)  lL p   lN p  
Individual without a loss ( )  0 nL p   nN p  
    
Then, the probabilities for joint events can be written as  
lL l L l L p pp r r ρ =+          ( 1 3 )  
 (1 ) lN l L l L p pp r r ρ =− − 
 (1 ) nL l L l L p pp r r ρ =− −  
 (1 )(1 ) nN l L l L p ppr r ρ =− − +  
where ρ  is the correlation coefficient,   is the standard deviation of event  l r i X  and   is the 
standard deviation of event
L r
a X  and the standard deviations are defined as  
10 
   (1 ) ll rpp =− l           ( 1 4 )  
  (1 ) LL rpp =− L           ( 1 5 )  
In addition, the covariance term between the events ( , ) ia X X  is in equations (13) and equal to   
(, ) ia l Cov X X rrL ρ =           ( 1 6 )  
Note that the value of the correlation coefficient parameter must be consistent with the fact that 
probabilities in equation (13) are all non-negative. We further assume that   and  . 
From these relationships, one can re-obtain the marginal probability of losses as  
0 lN p > 0 nL p >
  ll L l N p pp =+               ( 1 7 )  
  Ll Ln L p pp =+  
Insurance Decision for either Individual or Area Plans of Insurance 
This decision is similar to the choice between the county insurance plan GRP versus an 
individual APH yield insurance plan. The producer cannot have both the area plan and the 
individual plan at the same time. Having derived the demand for coverage with an individual 
plan in equation (8), we obtain the coverage demand for an area insurance plan next.  
The expected loss when the farmer holds  units of coverage solely from area insurance 
would be  
y
il L L l pl p yL l p yL =− = −
(
         ( 1 8 )  
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 And the variance of the farmer’s loss when the farmer solely holds coverage with area 






i ll L i l N i n L i n N i p l y L lp l lpy L lp l σ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ = − −+ −+ − −+ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣
(( ( ( ⎤ ⎦
(
    (19) 
Plugging the expression for l from equation 
(
(18) in equation (19), one can obtain    
22
i ll σ σ =+ ( ( ε .            ( 2 0 )    
where ε (  is the risk reduction that can be obtained by holding coverage with area insurance and 
equal to  
22 2 L l y L y ε σρ σ σ =− (             ( 2 1 )  






Max U M y l l π λσ
≥
=− − −
( ( ( .         ( 2 2 )  














.          ( 2 3 )  





















.           ( 2 5 )  









=+ ( .           ( 2 6 )  










= = ( .            ( 2 7 )  
The risk-reduction can be obtained with  y (  (after plugging  y (  from equation (27) in equation 
(21)) is  
22
l ε ρσ =− ( .            ( 2 8 )  
The expression in equation (27) was also derived in Miranda (1991) (see equation (13) on 
page 235) and is known as the farmer’s β . The farmer seeks higher coverage with an area plan 
the higher the correlation between the individual and area losses, the higher the farmer’s own 
risk ( l σ ), and the lower the variance of area loss. In particular, if  lL σ σ >  and the correlation is 
also sufficiently high so that  lL ρσσ > , then it would be optimal to set  1
y L y
π = > ( .    
       
13 
 Proposition 1.  If the farmer can hold coverage from either individual or area insurance, the 
farmer will prefer to hold coverage with individual insurance rather than area insurance when 
the premium rates are actuarially fair, that is, ( x l π =  for individual insurance and  y L π =  for 
area insurance). The utility level under individual coverage will be  ()
x
i l Ux M l
π = =− ( . 
Given the premium rates are actuarially fair, the farmer wants to minimize the variance of 
loss. With individual insurance, the farmer can minimize that risk to zero by fully insuring which 
can be verified from equation (6). However, with area insurance, the farmer cannot do the same 
unless the farmer’s and area losses are perfectly correlated, which can be verified from equation 
(28).  
Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov  (2007) claim that premium rates for MPCI yield plans have 
large positive “wedges”, that is, they are over-charged and are not actuarially fair due to moral 
hazard and adverse selection problems (see page 518 in their paper). If the rate for individual 
insurance is over-charged, then the demand for coverage with individual insurance in equation 
(8) is less than 1, that is, less than full insurance. Assuming the fair rate for area insurance, for a 
sufficiently high level of over-charge in individual insurance, one can verify that the area 
insurance could indeed be preferred over individual insurance.   
Insurance Decision for Area and Individual Plans of Insurance   
In this framework, the farmer pays premium for both individual and area plans, and can 
have both the area and individual plans simultaneously. This situation is similar to the state 
ACRE program, where the producer pays an implicit premium (gives up a portion of Direct 
Payments and marketing loans). Our framework is more general because the farmer can choose 
14 
 coverage levels from both plans. In addition, unlike the ‘double trigger” requirement in ACRE, 
our framework allows for the possibility that the farmer can be paid when the area has a loss but 
not the farmer, which is in line with GRP or GRIP plans of insurance. The latter makes the area 
insurance more desirable from farmer’s point of view.  
With the possibility of holding coverage from area and individual level insurances, the 







ˆ ˆ ˆ 0.5
i ix y i
x
y
MaxU M x y l π π
≥
≥
=− − − −λ σ       ( 2 9 )  
where   and  ˆ
i l
2 ˆ
i l σ  will be defined in the following. Using the relations in equations (5), (11), (13) 
and (17), one can obtain the expected indemnity for farmer i who is covered with both 
individual and area insurance. The expected indemnity (denote with  ) under separate plans can 
be defined as 
ˆ
i R
  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ˆ 0 il L l N n L n N
lL
R p xl yL p xl p yL p
px l p y L
=+ + + +
=+
      ( 3 0 )  
Then, one can verify that the expected loss (denote with  ) would be    ˆ
i l
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] ˆ (1 ) ( ) (1 ) ( ) 0
ˆ (1 ) ( )
il L l N n L n N
lL i
lp x l y L p x lpy L p
px l p y L l R
=− + − +− + − +
=− +− = −     (31) 
Note that comparing equations (5) and (31),  the additional coverage from area insurance 
decreases the farmer’s expected loss because of the higher expected indemnity, that is, 
comparing equation (4) and (30) yields  ˆ
i RR > i
(






2 2 ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (1 ) (1 ) (0 )
i ll L i l N i n L i n N i p xl y L l p xl l p y L l p l σ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ =− − − +− − + − − + − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣
⎤
⎦    (32) 
where   is as defined in equation  ˆ
i l (31). The preceding equation can be re-expressed in terms of 
the unconditional variance of the farmer’s loss from the individual plan (
2
l σ ) in equation (2) and 
the variance of the farmer’s loss from area insurance (
2
L σ ) in equation (10) and the covariance of 
discrete random outcomes for the individual and area ( ) as   ( , ) ia X X Cov
22 2 2 2 ˆ (1 ) 2(1 ) ( , )
i ll L i a x yx l y L C o v X σσ σ =− + − − X
l L
      ( 3 3 )  
Inserting the covariance term from equation (16) in the preceding equation yields: 
 
22 2 2 2 ˆ (1 ) 2(1 )
i ll L x yx l y L r r σ σσ ρ =− + − −        ( 3 4 )  
where   and   are defined in equations  l r L r (14) and (15). The preceding equation can be re-
expressed as    
22 2 2 2 ˆ (1 ) 2 (1 )
i ll L l L xy x y σ σσ ρσ =− + − − σ
22
        (35) 
The preceding equation can be re-arranged as   
ˆ ˆ
i ll σ σ =+ ε            ( 3 6 )  
where  ˆ ε  is the amount of risk-reduction that can be obtained by holding coverage with 
individual and/or area insurance plans: 17 
 
22 2 22 ˆ L 22 ( 1 ) llL l x xy x y ε σσσ ρσ =−+− −σ        ( 3 7 )  
The farmer will maximize utility by choosing coverage level x from individual insurance 
and coverage level   from area insurance. Differentiating the objective function in equation  y (29) 
with respect to the decision variables x and  ,  the necessary and sufficient y
5 first-order 
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Plugging the terms in equations (39) and (40) back into the F.O.C.s in equation (38) and solving 
for the demand for coverage in individual insurance and area insurance yields the  following: 
  22
() () ˆ 1










       ( 4 1 )  
22
() () ˆ










         
Lemma 1. The coverage demands for individual and area insurances are substitutes whenever 
the area and individual losses are positively and imperfectly correlated, that is, 01 ρ << .  
One can verify from equation (41) that the demand functions have positive cross-price 
derivatives whenever the correlation level is positive.  
Proposition 2. Assume that area and individual losses are positively and imperfectly correlated, 
that is, 01 ρ << . If the rates for individual and area insurance are fair, that is,  x l π =  and 
y L π = , then the individual will fully insure with individual insurance ( ˆ 1 x = ) and demand no 
area insurance, (   ).  ˆ 0 y =
The proof is straightforward after plugging the actuarially fair premiums into equation 
(41). Because the premium rates are fair, the farmer’s problem reduces to minimizing the risk. 
The farmer can achieve full reduction in risk by fully insuring with individual insurance and 
none with area insurance, which can be verified from equation (37). The following proposition provides the solution when area insurance becomes free, and 
individual insurance has the fair rate.  
Proposition 3.  If the premium for individual insurance is fair, that is,  x l π =  and the area 
insurance comes as free, that is,  0 y π = , then the individual will under-insure with individual 
insurance (that is,  ˆ 1 x < , therefore,   ˆ xll < ) whenever the individual and area losses are 









        ( 4 2 )  









   The following provide some comparative-statics results with respect to the parameters of 
the farmer’s problem such as the correlation level, amount of  farmer’s loss, the degree of risk 
aversion, and amount of area loss.  
Corollary 2: Assume that the premium for individual insurance is fair, that is,  x l π =  , the area 
insurance is free, that is,  0 y π = , and the area and individual losses are positively and 
imperfectly correlated, that is, 01 ρ << . The demand functions at these rates are given in 
equation (42).   
19 
 (1) The demand for individual insurance is decreasing when the correlation between area 















. The demand for area 
















(2) The demand for individual insurance is increasing when the amount of individual loss is 















 . The demand for area insurance is independent of the 
amount of individual loss. 
(3) The demand for individual insurance coverage is increasing whereas the demand for 





























. Moreover, in the limit  
0






=  and 
0






=  . 
(4) The demand for individual insurance is independent of the amount of area loss. Whereas 

















The intuition for the first result is that when area insurance is free (or its rate becomes lower 
than the fair rate), the risk-averse farmer can tolerate a certain level of positive variance on 
income by balancing it with some gain in expected income, and can start demanding positive 
coverage with area insurance. The second and third results are pretty straightforward. The last 
20 
 result can be counter-intuitive. When the amount of area loss increases, two things happen. First, 
because the area insurance is free, increasing amount of area loss increases expected indemnity 
from area insurance, therefore, the farmer’s expected income increases. However, increasing 
amount of area loss also increases the variance of farmer’s loss from equation (12). Because the 
second effect outweighs the first one, the farmer decreases its coverage with area insurance.  
With the availability of free area insurance while individual insurance has the fair rate, 
the farmer may want to over insure, that is, the farmer may want to hold more coverage in total 
than what is necessary to pay the entire loss. The following characterizes the over-insurance. 
Recall that for a farmer with coverage levels x from the individual plan and   from the area 
plan, then the indemnities under individual and area plans become 
y
xl  and , respectively.   yL
Corollary 3: Assume that the premium for individual insurance is fair, that is,  x l π =  , the area 
insurance comes as free, that is,  0 y π = , and the area and individual losses are positively and 
imperfectly correlated, that is, 01 ρ << . The demand functions at these rates are given in 
equation (42).   
(1) If  l r L r ρ = , then   ˆˆ xly L += l  , that is, for all λ  the farmer will fully insure using both 
individual and area insurance. If  l r L r ρ > , then   ˆˆ xly Ll + >  , that is, for all λ ,  the 
farmer will over-insure using both individual and area insurance. If  l r L r ρ < , then  
ˆˆ xly L +< l  , that is, for all λ  the farmer will under-insure using both individual and 
area insurance.  
(2) Moreover, consider the following threshold levels of λ :   
21 











−          (43)   
























= , which implies  1 ˆ λ   is greater, equal, or less than  2 ˆ λ  depending on 
whether L r ρ  is greater, equal, or less than  , respectively. Note also that:  if  l r 1 λ λ = , then  ˆ 0 x = ,  
and   implies  ˆ x > 0 1 λ λ >  . Then, depending on the magnitude of the degree of risk aversion 
relative to other parameters, the following hold: 
i.  If  ˆ λλ >  , then  .  ˆˆ 0 yL xl l << <
ii.  If  ˆ λλ = , then  ˆˆ 0 xly L <= < l . 
iii.  If  12 ˆˆ ˆ max{ , } λ λλ << λ , then  ˆˆ 0 xly Ll < << .  
iv.  If 12 L l rr λ λρ >⇔ >  and  1 ˆ λ λ > , then  ˆˆ 0 xly Ll < << .  
22 
 
v.  If  12 L l rr λ λρ <⇔ <  and   2 ˆ λ λ =  , then  ˆˆ 0 xly Ll < <= . 
vi.  If  12 L l rr λ λρ <⇔ <  and   12 ˆˆ λ λλ < <  , then  ˆˆ 0 xlly L < << .  
Finally, the overlap between area insurance and individual crop insurance payments would be 
the excess amount of indemnities over the farmer’s loss, that is,  ˆˆ max{( ) ,0} xly L l + − . 
Note that the claims (2.i) and (2.vi) above together with the limit result in claim (3) in 
Corollary 2 indicate that as the farmer gets more risk-averse, the farmer will choose higher 
coverage and therefore expected indemnities with the individual plan relative to the area plan. Insurance Decision for the Integrated Individual and Area Plans of Insurance 
In integrated programs, area payments offset crop insurance indemnities (Babcock, 
2010). Integrated programs are also known as “wrapped insurance” where individual insurance 
works as if it is “wrapped” around area insurance because it only pays when individual 
indemnities exceed area level indemnities and pays the residual amount once area payments are 
netted out (Coble and Barnett, 2008). In line with this, we define the individual insurance 
indemnities netted out from area payments as  
23 
 
0 } {, Max xl yL Δ≡ −           ( 4 4 )  
Note that  . Also, whenever  0 xl ≥Δ≥ 0 Δ = , area payments totally offset the individual 
insurance payments.  One can obtain the expected loss of the farmer under the integrated 
program as (denote with  ) as   i l%
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] (1 ) ( ) 0 il L l N n L n N lp l y Lp x lpy L p =− Δ − + − + − + %
     ( 4 5 )  
Note that compared to the farmer’s expected loss with coverage with separate plans given in 
equation (31),  
 
  [ ] ˆ
ii l L llpx l =+ − Δ %           (46) 
 
Therefore, expected loss at the same coverage levels is higher under the integrated plans 
compared to the one under separate plans. This is because the expected indemnity under 
integrated plans is lower than that under separate plans, which can be verified as follows:   
The expected indemnity with integrated plans (denote with  i R %  ) as  
  [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] 0 il L l N n L n N R p yL p xl p yL p =Δ ++ + + %       ( 4 7 )  
  
Then, the expected loss of the farmer i from equation (45) can be re-expressed as 
 
  il i lp l Rl R =− = − % %
i %           ( 4 8 )  
 
Using equations (30), (46) and (47), one obtains that  
[ ] ˆ
il L i R px l =Δ − + % R           ( 4 9 )    
From equation (44),  it follows that  ˆ
ii RR < % .  
Furthermore, the variance of the farmer’s loss when the farmer holds coverage from both 
individual and area insurance under the integrated program is  
22 2 2 2 (1 ) (0 )
i ll L i l N i n L i n N i p l y Ll p x ll p y Ll p l σ ⎡⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤ ⎡ = − Δ − −+ − −+ − −+ − ⎣⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ ⎣
%% % % ⎤ ⎦
%
   (50) 
where   is as defined in  i l% (46). Plug equations (32) and (46) into equation (50) and obtain 
22
i ll σ σ =+ % % ε            (51) 
where ε % is the risk-reduction that can be obtained under integrated plans and can be written as,   
  [ ] [ ] [ ]
2 ˆ 2 (1 ) (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) lL l lL L lL lL pp l x x l pp y L x l pp x l εε = + − − −Δ − − −Δ + − −Δ %  (52) 
where  ˆ ε  is the risk-reduction can be obtained under separate plans from equation (37). Note that 
ε % can be lower or greater than  ˆ ε  (therefore, 
2
i l σ %  in equation (51) can be higher or lower than 
2 ˆ
i l σ  
from equation (36)) depending on the coverage levels x and  , and other parameters.  y









i ix y i
x
y
MaxU M x y l π π
≥
≥
=− − − − % % % λ σ         ( 5 3 )  
where   is the utility function of the farmer under integrated programs, and   and  i U %
i l% 2
i l σ %  are 
defined in equations  (46) and  (51), respectively. Note that the formulations of   and  i l% 2
i l σ % , and 
therefore, the objective function depend on whether  0 Δ =  or   0 Δ > . Our solution strategy is to 
divide the problem in equation (53) into two sub-problems by assuming  0 Δ = (Assumption 1 
below) and   (Assumption 2 below) and finally combining the solutions obtained based on 
these assumptions in order to find the optimum for the original problem in equation 
0 Δ>
(53).  
Assumption 1: Assume indemnities under the individual plan are lower than that under 
area plan, that is,  , which implies that  0 xl yL −≤ 0 Δ = . Plugging  0 Δ =  in equations (46) and 
(51) would yield expressions for the farmer’s expected loss with coverage (denote with   ) and 
variance of the farmer’s losses with coverage (denote with 
,1 i l%
2
,1 i l σ % ) , respectively as follows: 
,1 ˆ
iil L ll p x =+ % l
22
           ( 5 4 )  
,1 1 i ll σ σε =+ % %            ( 5 5 )  
[ ] [ ] [ ]
2
1 ˆ 2 (1 ) (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) lL l lL L lL lL p p l x xl p p yL xl p p xl εε =+ − − − − + − %      (56) 
where  1 ε %  is the level of risk-reduction can be obtained under Assumption 1, and   and  ˆ
i l ˆ ε  are 
defined in equations (31)  and (37), respectively. Plugging   and  ,1 i l% 2
,1 i l σ %  back in equation in (53) 




,1 1 1 ,1 ,1 0.5
i ix y i UM x y l π π =− − −− % % λ σ         ( 5 7 )  
Assumption 2: Assume indemnities under the individual plan are higher than  under the 
area plan, that is,  , which implies that  0 xl yL −≥ 0 xl yL Δ =− ≥ . Similarly, plugging 
xly L Δ= −
2
,2 i l
 into equations (46) and (51) would yield expressions for  the farmer’s expected loss 
(denote with  )  with coverage and variance of the farmer’s losses with coverage (denote with  ,2 i l%
σ %  ) as follows: 
,2 ˆ
ii l L ll p y =+ % L          ( 5 8 )  
22
,2 2 i ll σ σε =+ % %            ( 5 9 )  
[ ] [ ] [ ]
2
2 ˆ 2 (1 ) (1 ) 2 (1 ) (1 ) lL l lL L lL lL p p l x yL p p yL yL p p yL εε =+ − − − − + − %    (60) 
where  2 ε %  is the level of risk-reduction can be obtained under Assumption 2, and   and  ˆ
i l ˆ ε  as 
defined earlier.  
Plugging   and  ,2 i l% 2
,2 i l σ %  back into equation in (53) would yield an expression for the 
objective function: 
2
,2 2 2 ,2 ,2 0.5
i ix y i UMx y l l π π =− − −− % % λ σ        ( 6 1 )  
To summarize, Assumption 1 yields the objective function given in equation (57) and 
Assumption 2 yields the one in equation (61). Each objective function is assumed to be concave 
over the entire domain of (,) x y , which is the non-negative orthant of real numbers. Then, the 
Hessian Matrix for each objective function is assumed to be negative definite (see also the denominator terms in Tables 1 and 2). Each objective function is initially maximized over the 
entire domain of (,) x y  as if it is an unconstrained problem. A solution obtained by solving the 
necessary and sufficient F.O.C.s will maximize the given objective function over the entire 
domain. The resulting solutions are referred as ‘interior solutions’ below. Nevertheless, there is 
no guarantee that the interior solutions would satisfy the assumption from which the associated 
objective function is derived. Against this possibility, the objective functions in equations (57) 
and (61) are also maximized under the constraint of  xly L = . The resulting solutions are referred 
as ‘boundary solutions’ below.  As a result of this process, the following solution candidates for 
the maximization of the original problem in equation (53) are obtained. 
From Assumption 1 with the objective function in equation (57):  
The interior solution (denote with  11 ,
ii x y %% ):  
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1 () lL p 1
i
x y xll L 2 0 π δπ δ δ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− − + − + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ %        ( 6 2 )  
11 2 ()
i
yl L x yL l p l 0 π βπ β ⎡⎤ =− +− − + ⎣⎦ %
b
β ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦          
The boundary solution (denote with  11 ,
b x y %% ) : 
1 () lL p 1
b
x y xll L 2 0 π ηπ η η ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ − + − + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ % =−        ( 6 3 )  




yL l p l
L LL
π ηπ η ⎡⎤ =− +− − ⎣⎦ % η + ⎡⎤ ⎣⎦  
Table 1 depicts the coefficients ( 0 δ  ,  0 β  and  0 η  as the intercept terms;  1 δ ,  1 β  and  1 η  as 
the own-price effects; and  2 δ ,  2 β , and  2 η  as the cross-price effects ) in these solutions. From Assumption 2 with the objective function in equation (61):  
The interior solution (denote with  2




xy l L xl L p L 2 0 π θπ θ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− +−− + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ % θ        ( 6 4 )  
21
i
yl L x yL p L l 2 0 π κπ κ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =−− +− + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ % κ
b
         
 
The boundary solution (denote with  22 ,
b x y %% ): 
21 ()
b





yL p L l 1 0
l
L LL
π ϕπ ϕ ⎡⎤ ⎡⎤ =− − + − + ⎣⎦ ⎣⎦ % ϕ  
Table 2 depicts the coefficients ( 0 θ  ,  0 κ  and  0 ϕ  as the intercept terms;  1 θ ,   and  1 κ 1 ϕ  as 
the own-price effects; and  2 θ ,  , and  2 κ 2 ϕ  as the cross-price effects ) in these solutions. 
Denote the solutions to be selected based on Assumptions 1 and 2 with  11 (,) x y %% and 
22 (,) x y %%,  respectively. In selecting the solutions for a given assumption, the following steps are 
taken: (1) verify that the interior solution is actually consistent with the initial assumption. (2) If 
so, then select the interior solution. (3) If not, select the boundary solution for that assumption. 
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Then (4) the  objective function given in equation (57) is evaluated at  11 (,) x y %%(denote the 
resulting value with   ) and the objective function given in equation  ,1 ,1 1 1 (,) ii UU x y = % %%
)
(61) is 
evaluated at  22 (, x y %% (denote the resulting value with   ). Finally, (5) The higher 
of those two will be the solution that maximizes the objective function in equation 
,2 ,1 2 (, ii UU x = % %% 2) y
(53) in the 
entire domain of x and  y . Denote the final optimal solution with (,) x y %%.  Then, the maximized 
value of the objective function in equation (53) is 




Table 1: The Coefficients for the Candidate Solutions under Assumption 1 
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where   l , 
2
0 2( 1 ) lL l pp φ =− [ ]
2
1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) lL lL lL l p ppp φ =− −− l , and  2 2( 1 ) lL L p pl L φ = −  are the terms in addition to 
2 ˆ
i l σ  in the variance equation 
(55), 
           
2 ) L  is the denominator term for the interior solution, and      
22
11 2 () ( 0 . 5 lL l D σφ σ φρ σ σ =+ − −
           
22
l L 13 0 2 2
11
22 2 ( ) 2 2 ll L L
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D
lL L L L L




 is the denominator term for the boundary solution.  








Table 2: The Coefficients for the Candidate Solutions under Assumption 2 
 
Intercept Term  Own-Price Effect  Cross-Price Effect 
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where  l L 0 2( 1 ) lL l pp ω ≡− ,  [ ]
2
1 (1 ) 2 (1 ) lL lL lL L p ppp ω ≡− −− L  , and  l L 2 2( 1 ) lL l pp ω ≡ −  are the terms in addition to 
2 ˆ
i l σ  in the variance 
equation (59),   
           2 ()
2 22
21 () 0 . 5 lL l L D σ σω ρ σ σ ω =+ − −  is the denominator term for the interior solution,   
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is the denominator term for the boundary solution. 
Note that the denominator terms are positive due to the negative definiteness of the Hessian of the objective function.  The following proposition gives the solution for the problem in equation (53) when the 




Proposition 4:  Consider a non-negative imperfect correlation between the farmer’s loss and 
area loss (0 ρ ≤< ). If the rates are actuarially fair, that is,  () xl lp l π =− % L  and  y L π = % when 
 and  0 Δ= x l π = %  and  () y Lp L π =− % l L  when  0 Δ >
20 1
, then the solution to the maximization 
problem in equation (53)  would be  xx θ = == %%  and  20 0 yy κ = == %% . The farmer’s utility 
would be  i UM = l − at the optimal solution.  
  Given fair premium rates, the farmer wants to minimize the variance of the farmer’s loss 
by holding coverage. The farmer can achieve 100% reduction in that variance by fully insuring 
with individual insurance and not demanding any area insurance coverage. This can be verified 
from equation (59) and together with equation (37).  
The following proposition gives the solution for the problem in equation (53) when the 
premium rate for individual insurance is actuarially fair and area insurance is free. As in 
Corollary 3 under separate plans, when insurance products are not fairly priced, the optimal 
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where  2 0 1 λ λ << %%  because it can be shown that  0
l
L
β <  where  0 β  is the intercept term in 
demand equation for area coverage derived under Assumption 1 (see equation (62) and Table 1). Note that  1 λ %  is the threshold level of risk-aversion at which the interior and boundary solutions 
under Assumptions 1 coincide (see equations (62) to (63)). The level  2 λ %  is similarly defined but 
for the solutions under Assumption 2 (see equations (64) and (65)). Note again that these 
solutions are evaluated at the premium rate for individual insurance that is actuarially fair and 
area insurance is free.  




















         ( 6 9 )    
where  1 y %  and  2 y % are the coverage level demand with the area plan under Assumption 1 and 2, 
respectively, as formulated in equation (66). Also, the variance terms in the denominator 
2
,1 i l σ %  
and 
2
,2 i l σ %  are from the equations (55) and (59), respectively. At the fair rate for individual 
insurance and free area insurance, it can be established that  12 y y > %% and 
2
,1 ,2 i ll
2
i σ σ > %%  . Therefore, 
the numerator of λ %  shows the gain in expected income, whereas the denominator shows the 
disutility from increased variance. For the marginal farmer with the level λ %  degree of risk 
aversion, the gain in expected income is just equal to the disutility from increased variance from 
choosing (, 11 ) x y %% vis-à-vis  22 (,) x y %%, which are formulated in equation (66) and evaluated at the 
fair rate for individual insurance and free rate for the area plan. Note also that it can be can 
further established  1 0 λ λ ≤ %% < .  
  
Proposition 5: Consider the case of non-negative and imperfect correlation (01 ρ ≤< ) between 
the farmer’s and area losses.  Also assume that the rate for individual plans is actuarially fair, that is,  ( x lp l π =− % ) l L  when   and  0 Δ= x l π = %  when  0 Δ > , and the area insurance coverage is 
free, that is,  0 y π = % . Recall that (,) x y %%
 
denotes the final optimal solution for the problem in 
equation (53).  
(1)  If  1 λ ≤ % 0 λ λ % <<  , then the farmer chooses to set  0 Δ =  and the solution is given in 




i xx == %% 2 1 L δ +           ( 7 0 )  
1
i yy 1 L 0 β β + == %%
1 0
  
(2)  If  λ λ < % λ % <<  , then the farmer chooses to set  0 Δ =  and the solution is given in 
equation (63) after plugging the premium rates: 
1










      
      
(3)  If 0 λ λ << % , then the farmer sets  0 Δ >  and the solution is given in equation (64) 
after plugging the premium rates:  
22
i
lL xx Lp ==− ⎣ %% 1 + L θ ⎡⎤ ⎦   
      ( 7 2 )  
21 L κ ⎤ ⎦
i
lL yy Lp ⎡ ==− ⎣ %%   
(4)  If 0 λ λ <= % , the farmer is indifferent in setting  0 Δ =  or  0 Δ > and the solution in this 
case is given in equations (70) and (72). 
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Similar to the case for separate plans, free area insurance would increase the farmer’s 
expected income and therefore the farmer could tolerate some level of positive variance, and 
would demand positive coverage with area insurance. Relative to separate plans, the farmer can 
curtail the positive variance to some extent by increasing the coverage demands (beyond 100% 
loss) with individual insurance and area insurance. The farmer is able to do this because the 
duplication of payments is prevented in the event both area and individual have losses under 
integrated plans.  
Furthermore, unless the farmer is highly risk-averse (as in claims 3 and 4 above), the 
actuarially fair individual insurance rates will go down because the farmer’s expected indemnity 
from the individual plan would be lower as the indemnity in the event both the area and the 
farmer have losses would be picked up by area plan. 
 
Connections to Relevant Studies 
A number of recent studies have analyzed the existing and proposed area plans of 
insurance and their interaction with crop insurance.  
Regarding GRP or GRIP, Barnett, Black and Skees (2005) find that GRP can be a viable 
alternative to the MPCI yield plan at least in some crops and regions despite the basis risk 
inherent in GRP. Basis risk refers to the possibility that a producer would not be indemnified for 
the producer’s actual loss. Based on an analysis for cotton and soybean production in Georgia 
and South Carolina, Deng, Barnett, and Vedenov (2007) find that GRP yield insurance may be a 
viable alternative to MPCI yield insurance (even in heterogeneous regions) if the rates for farm-
level insurance are over-priced, therefore not fair, while the GRP rates are fair. More recently 
Chaffin (2009) examined the farmer’s choice between insurance plans that trigger at the farm or 36 
 
county level in a simulation study, which included GRP, GRIP, GRIP with Harvest Price Option 
(HPO) along with the APH individual yield plan and the individual revenue plans, Revenue 
Assurance (RA) and RA with HPO. The study identifies the factors determining the optimal 
choice among insurance plans as the correlation between county yield and farm yield and 
whether the farm is spatially diverse in a given county. Unless the correlation coefficient is 
above 0.9 and the farm is spatially diverse, the study recommends serious caution in choosing a 
county plan.  
Regarding ACRE,  Zulauf, Dicks, and Vitale (2008); Zulauf (2009); Zulauf, Schnitkey 
and Langemier (2010); Paulson, Schnitkey and Zulauf (2009); Schnitkey and Paulson (2009) and 
Paulson (2009) tend to view ACRE and Revenue CI working more as complements rather than 
substitutes and recommend that farmers participate in ACRE and purchase CI. In ACRE, the 
crop insurance premium paid by the producer is added to the farm-level ACRE guarantee, 
increasing the probability of a payment and giving an extra incentive for farmers to sign up.  
However, ACRE may provide incentives to reduce CI coverage levels and use yield insurance 
rather than revenue insurance (Paulson, Schnitkey and Zulauf, 2009).   
Zulauf, Dicks, and Vitale (2008) and Zulauf, Schnitkey and Langemier (2010) argue that 
ACRE would allow farmers to better adjust to possible declining prices and would be effective 
for large declines in prices that last longer than one year. ACRE may address price risk across 
years via the 10% cap and cup on the state guarantee and also by the use of the moving average 
of past prices, whereas CI protects against price risks only up to the harvest time in the current 
production year. Under the assumption of a stable demand for a commodity, if productivity gains 
are higher than input cost increases, commodity production would expand and equilibrium prices 
would fall, which would lead to lower base prices and lower guarantees. However, a lower 37 
 
guarantee might not cover the increase in production cost, which has tended to increase in recent 
years.  
The preceding argument in Zulauf, Dicks, and Vitale (2008) and Zulauf, Schnitkey and 
Langemier (2010) has the following limitations. The stable demand assumption in these studies 
may not hold. Rising global food and fiber demand, the recent approval of higher ethanol blend 
levels in the U.S. and recent supply shortages in the world market seem to indicate that stocks 
may remain tight for major crops, which would tend to limit price declines. It is also not also 
clear why productivity gains may increase faster than input cost increases during the life of the 
next Farm Bill. Furthermore, if prices were to increase sharply over time, CI revenue plans 
would respond more quickly and appropriately than ACRE. Based on a historical analysis 
covering 31 years from 1977 to 2007, Schnitkey and Paulson (2009) report that 18 out of 31 
times the year-over-year increase in the state guarantee is capped at 10%.  They do not report on 
the frequency of which the state guarantee is cupped. Given the rising prices and increasing 
volatility in the last decade, it seems reasonable to think that the state guarantee would be capped 
at least as often in the future as in the past. 
 Somewhat contrary to the aforementioned studies, Hong, Power and Vedenov (2009) 
find that a representative farmer in representative counties in Midwestern and Southern regions 
prefers Crop Revenue Coverage (CRC) revenue insurance over the combination of ACRE and 
CRC. This preference is more pronounced for cotton production in Hockley County (irrigated) 
and Hale County (non-irrigated) in Texas (where yield risk is high and yield and price are not 
highly correlated) relative to corn production in Piatt County in Illinois. In the latter county, the 
CRC option is only slightly preferred to the ACRE and CRC option.  38 
 
Even though ACRE is optional for all eligible farmers and farmers do not directly pay for 
ACRE, selection of ACRE has an implicit premium as farmers must give up 20% of their direct 
payment and their entire price-based countercyclical payment, along with a 30% reduction to 
their marketing loan rate. This implicit premium does not change with the risk associated with 
ACRE, and is not based on actuarial or underwriting considerations (Barnaby, 2010). If the 
implicit premium is mispriced, this may encourage or discourage participation in ACRE 
depending on the producer’s risk of loss. In addition, the multiyear commitment for participation 
in ACRE and the program complexity may have curtailed participation levels. Overall, 
participation in ACRE has been low and rather selective by crop and region (Barnett, 2010). 
Specifically, nearly 13% of all eligible acres nationwide enrolled in ACRE in 2009; corn and 
soybeans have about 15% enrolled; wheat is 13%; rice and cotton are 0%. About 25% of corn 
acres in Illinois, Nebraska, South Dakota corn are enrolled in ACRE, while Iowa and Indiana are 
about 16%. Barnaby (2010) points out that risk management was probably not the main reason 
for wheat (especially winter wheat) producers selecting ACRE as they had the information to 
adversely select on ACRE. Unlike the CI guarantee based on futures prices, the ACRE guarantee 
is calculated based on a moving average of past prices, which may not reflect current market 
conditions, and may distort farmers’ planting decisions (Babcock, 2009).   
Simulation studies such as Dismukes, Arriola, and Coble (2010) and Cooper (2010) find 
that ACRE tends to pay more in areas with high expected yield and low yield variability. ACRE 
is also ineffective in covering a farm’s idiosyncratic risk—those uncorrelated with widespread 
losses.  
GRP and GRIP will likely continue to serve as useful insurance products for a limited 
area of the country where farms are more homogeneous in their response to natural disasters. 39 
 
However, the increased farm premium subsidies for enterprise units appear to be cutting into the 
market share for these products. Proposals such as moving ACRE closer to the farm-level 
coverage in the form of a county-level revenue guarantee presumably hope to gain from higher 
correlation levels of losses between the county and the average farm relative to those between 
the state and the average farm. Regarding the actual levels of the correlation by county, we are 
unaware of comprehensive U.S. estimates of farm and county yield, loss, or revenue correlations 
based on individual farm data.  
Coble, Dismukes, and Thomas (2007) report simulated national average yield 
correlations between county and farm of 0.89 for corn, 0.87 for soybeans, and 0.89 for cotton, 
high enough to suggest some potential attractiveness for county plans. However, caution is 
warranted with these numbers as the national average revenue correlations between farm and 
state reported in the same study, which are 0.74 for corn, 0.72 for soybeans and 0.746 for cotton, 
are higher than those recently reported in Dismukes, Arriola, and Coble (2010). The latter study 
reports that the U.S. average farm-state revenue correlations are 0.55 for corn, 0.54 for soybeans 
and 0.39 for cotton.  
Barnett, Black and Skees (2005) report estimated average correlations between farm and 
county yields for corn in 10 states using individual farm data on nearly 67,000 farms during 
1985-1994. Their correlations varied widely; they were generally high in the heart of the corn 
belt, ranging from 0.71 in Ohio to 0.82 in Illinois, but fell to 0.49 in Texas and 0.36 in Michigan. 
These wide correlation differences across regions suggest that county area plans are likely to be 
of widely differing risk reduction value to producers in various regions. Large divergences in 40 
 
value complicate the determination of an appropriate implicit premium for any foregone farm 
program payments if the current ACRE program is shifted to a county revenue guarantee.  
Furthermore, a county-based ACRE program would face significant operational hurdles. 
There are already separate county CI programs with explicit premiums, such as GRP and GRIP. 
The experience with these programs has pointed out significant problems with the availability of 
reliable county yield estimates from the National Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS), which 
RMA uses as a basis for the GRP and GRIP programs. RMA discontinued GRP/GRIP programs 
in 1,062 counties in 2010, which included counties producing corn, soybeans, grain sorghum, 
and peanuts, because the revised standards introduced by NASS resulted in fewer but more 
reliable county estimates. Moreover, the Farm Service Agency and NASS would face substantial 
additional workloads if ACRE were to be restructured to operate on county-level data, and both 
agencies already operate under limited funding and staff.   
County-based ACRE proposals seem to overlook the fact that farmers have had little 
demand for GRP and GRIP in many regions of the country, as these plans accounted for less than 4% 
of the total MPCI program premium in 2010. This is consistent with our finding of a strong 
preference to hold individual insurance and fully insure when rates are fair. Integrating a county-
based ACRE plan with crop insurance can lead to program savings through elimination of 
duplication of payments. Nevertheless, our findings further indicate that the county-based plan 
integrated with an individual policy, such as a county ACRE plan, will be desired by the farmer 
only if it is underpriced and the farmer can over insure, that is, the farmer would want to hold 




Our findings confirm that crop insurance is best suited for providing individual risk 
protection tailored to the risks and characteristics of individual farmers’ operations. We conclude 
that farm programs should not be redesigned to function as area plans which would be intended 
to overlap or substitute for crop insurance. Farm programs can be compatible with crop 
insurance—they can do what crop insurance does not, such as enhancing income, if that is the 
policy choice, or partially compensating for crop insurance deductibles. However, it does not 
seem prudent to try to displace crop insurance with a low cost or free farm program with limited 
coverage options and, presumably, payment limitations. Instead, crop insurance, as a dynamic, 
self-correcting, and evolving program of individual risk protection that is partly funded through 
producer-paid premiums, should be strengthened to enhance its position as the key long-term 
tool for agricultural risk management.   42 
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